## Pakistan

### 2AC Drones DA – Generic

#### Drone strikes are inevitable---which means the link threshold is thin---we’re still killing terrorists either way---no external impact to the DA.

#### Uniqueness disproves the link---Terror threat is high now, which means signature strikes fail---causes civilian casualties and blowback which create a new pool of militants---destabilizes Pakistan and kills US diplomatic efforts. That’s Shah and Hudson.

#### Leadership decapitation solves---comprehensive data proves that high-value targeting undermines organizational effectiveness---leadership succession is impossible and collapses terrorist organizations. That’s Jones

#### Plan makes drones sustainable---backlash cuts off support from host countries and causes base kick-out---tanks effective drones operations. That’s Zenko

#### Signature strikes cause targeting mistakes---military votes aff

Greenfield 13 DANYA GREENFIELD is the deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group. “The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like Terrorists,” 8-19-13, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/> DOA: 8-26-13, y2k

As Mark Bowden discusses in this month's Atlantic cover story, there is great debate about whether drone strikes should be a core component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Of all the the arguments in favor, those emphasizing effectiveness of signature strikes are particularly dubious. The term "signature strike" is used to distinguish strikes conducted against individuals who "match a pre-identified 'signature' of behavior that the U.S. links to militant activity," rather than targeting a specific person. The United States should not allow signature strikes because the cost of these attacks far outweighs the potential benefit. Leaving aside significant concerns about the legality of such strikes, there are serious questions about the efficacy of this approach in undermining terrorist networks. The problem with signature strikes is that they open the door to a much higher incidence of civilian casualties--and this is where the danger lies. If the United States is choosing targets based on suspicious activity or proximity to other known-terrorists, this falls short of the threshold for drone strikes set by the Obama Administration, perpetuates a disastrous U.S. image in Yemen, and serves to invigorate the ranks of those groups the United States aims to disable. In response to increasing criticism, President Obama outlined his counterterrorism policy in May 2013 with a speech at National Defense University. Obama noted that the U.S. will only act against "terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat." He did not, however, directly address the use of signature strikes, leaving open the prospect that they could be used in the ongoing fight against terrorism. This would be a mistake. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, extensive signature strikes sparked a significant increase in anti-American sentiment. After years of drone strikes, 74 percent of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy by 2012 (up from 64 percent in 2009) according to a Pew Research Center poll. The White House authorized signature strikes for Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they have not employed this tactic to date. If true, the incidence of civilian and non-combatant casualties in Yemen means that faulty intelligence and targeting failures are to blame, which is perhaps even more worrisome. In waging the drone campaign, the United States occasionally hits precisely the wrong person. A U.S. strike in August 2012 supposedly killed three al-Qaeda militants in Yemen. Among the casualties, however, was an anti-Qaeda imam and a policeman he had brought along for protection. The imam was working to dismantle al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), making him precisely the sort of local ally the U.S. desperately needs in a place like Yemen. Yemeni Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkul Karman warned that Yemeni tribal leaders in areas where civilians have been killed in drone strikes say that these attacks drive more Yemenis to turn against Washington. During his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Yemeni writer Farea al-Muslimi recounted an incident where the eldest son of a man killed by a drone joined AQAP because he identifies the U.S. as his father's killer and wants revenge. As the deaths and injuries mount, dangerous anti-American sentiment grows. When drone strikes occur and non-combatants are killed, Yemenis lash out with protests demanding justice and accountability from the United States--which has not been forthcoming. In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated, many Yemenis will admit they would support targeted assassinations if there is clear intelligence that an individual is a senior operative within AQAP and plotting a specific and imminent act of terror against Americans. The problem with signature strikes is that they do not meet this threshold--not even remotely-- and they open the door for the U.S. to make grievous targeting mistakes and be seen as taking sides in a domestic insurgency. Signature strikes target low-level militants who might be nasty characters, but they are not necessarily planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position. Beyond signature strikes, there is a more fundamental question that we should be asking--a question of overall strategy: is the current drone program achieving our national security objectives? It is not just civil libertarians and human rights advocates that are sounding the alarm; a group of 30 foreign policy experts sent a letter to President Obama in March 2013 calling for an end to the current drone strategy. Even senior retired members of the military, including General Stanley McChrystal, believe drone strikes are counterproductive because of the blowback they foment among the local population. Targeted killings may eliminate key al-Qaeda leaders, but when civilians die along with them, these strikes ensure that a generation of Yemenis, Pakistanis, or Somalis will blame the U.S. for killing innocent community members, exacerbating America's serious image problems abroad and creating a space for extremist ideology to take root. In short, the U.S. drone program not only undermines the long-term national security of the United States by fostering widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, it also undermines the legitimacy of the host country government, whose support the U.S. needs, and it provides fodder for jihadi rhetoric that strengthens the very groups the U.S. seeks to destroy.

#### Prefer consensus---signature strikes strengthens insurgency

Glaser 12 John Glaser, House Members Call on Obama to Legally Justify ‘Signature’ Drone Strikes, 6-13-12, <http://news.antiwar.com/2012/06/13/house-members-call-on-obama-to-legally-justify-signature-drone-strikes/> DOA: 9-3-13, y2k

“We are concerned that the use of such ‘signature’ strikes could raise the risk of killing innocent civilians or individuals who may have no relationship to attacks on the United States,” they wrote. “The implications of the use of drones for our national security are profound. They are faceless ambassadors that cause civilian deaths, and are frequently the only direct contact with Americans that the targeted communities have.”¶ In order to avoid dealing with the inevitable increase in civilian casualties inherent in employing signature strikes, the administration “embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties” that “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.”¶ The House members are in accord with [a growing chorus of experts and former U.S. officials](http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2012/06/06/former-cia-official-drone-war-kills-innocents-creates-terrorist-safe-havens/) in their concern that the overly broad drone war and its indiscriminate targeting procedures [are creating more enemies than it is eliminating](http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2012/06/11/ca-rep-says-drone-strikes-creating-real-enemies/).¶ Robert Grenier, who headed the CIA’s counter-terrorism center from 2004 to 2006 and was previously a CIA station chief in Pakistan, [said recently](http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2012/06/06/former-cia-official-drone-war-kills-innocents-creates-terrorist-safe-havens/) the drone program is too sweeping and may be creating terrorist safe havens.¶ “We have gone a long way down the road of creating a situation where we are creating more enemies than we are removing from the battlefield. We are already there with regards to Pakistan and Afghanistan,” he said.¶ “If you strike them indiscriminately you are running the risk of creating a terrific amount of popular anger. They have tribes and clans and large families. Now all of a sudden you have a big problem … I am very concerned about the creation of a larger terrorist safe haven in Yemen,” Grenier said.¶ As Charles Schmitz, a Yemen expert at Towson University in Maryland, [told the Los Angeles Times](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-yemen-20120402%2C0%2C3212469.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+latimes/mostviewed+%28L.A.+Times+-+Most+Viewed+Stories%29), “The more the U.S. applies its current policy, the stronger Al Qaeda seems to get.”

### A2: Alternatives

#### Decision-makers will inevitably pursue drone-strategy.

Zenko 13 Micah Zenko is CFR Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council of Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736>, Accessed Date: 6-4-13 y2k

Compared to other military tools, the advantages of using drones— particularly, that they avoid direct risks to U.S. servicemembers— vastly outweigh the limited costs and consequences. Decision-makers are now much more likely to use lethal force against a range of perceived threats than in the past. Since 9/11, over 95 percent of all nonbattlefield targeted killings have been conducted by drones—the remaining attacks were JSOC raids and AC-130 gunships and offshore sea- or air-launched cruise missiles. And the frequency of drone strikes is only increasing over time. George W. Bush authorized more nonbattlefield targeted killing strikes than any of his predecessors (50), and Barack Obama has more than septupled that number since he entered office (350). Yet without any meaningful checks—imposed by domestic or international political pressure—or sustained oversight from other branches of government, U.S. drone strikes create a moral hazard because of the negligible risks from such strikes and the unprecedented disconnect between American officials and personnel and the actual effects on the ground.14 However, targeted killings by other platforms would almost certainly inflict greater collateral damage, and the effectiveness of drones makes targeted killings the more likely policy option compared to capturing suspected militants or other nonmilitary options.

### Pakistan – UQ – Terror High

#### Threat of terrorism is high---NONE of their evidence assumes specific organizations in Pakistan---Al Qaeda, Haqqui network, Taliban, and LeT are gearing for attacks---they have capability and motivation to attack---they have ALREADY infiltrated the nuclear networks---our evidence cites quantitative and biographical studies. That’s Cole, Rotella, and Tankel evidence.

## Norms

### Proliferation – Impacts – 2AC

#### Senkaku conflict is very likely---previous naval clashes prove brink is now---drones cause escalatory conflict because the threshold for intervention is lower---Sino-Japan conflict escalates to nuclear due to tinderbox conditions---US security guarantee means we’ll be drawn in. That’s Auslin and Blaxland.

### Proliferation – Internal – Norms

#### Plan checks Chinese drone usage---Signature Strikes violate international law by targeting noncombatants---sets a precedent for unlawful targeted killing. That’s Eviatar and Bodeen.

#### AND-US key to shape norms---over-usage of drone strikes fuel arms race---restraint increases US leverage for diplomatic pressure which empirically checks weapons usage. That’s Farley and Zenko.

## 2AC T- SS

#### We meet---Signature strikes allow for specific targeting---solves your offense.

Daskal 13 Jennifer Daskal, American University Washington College of Law, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for

Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict,” 2013, <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=facsch_lawrev>, DOA: 9-18-13, y2k

Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter of law, the United States continues to press a broad definition of the enemy force, its actions, as a matter of policy, are more restrained. Specifically, it focuses its targeted-killing operations on those who pose a “significant threat”57 and only as a matter of last resort. In the words of John Brennan, the United States does not seek to kill every al Qaeda member, but instead focuses its efforts on “disrupt[ing] . . . plans and . . . plots before they come to fruition,”58 and limits lethal strikes to situations in which it is the “only recourse” against the threat.59 Brennan cites operational leaders, operatives in the midst of training for an attack, and persons who possess unique operational skills that are being leveraged for an attack.60 But no binding limits have yet been articulated, and it is not clear that they exist.61 Are the examples of possible targets exclusive or merely illustrative? How far along does the attack planning need to be? Is mere agreement to plot or plan enough? In what situations is lethal targeting considered the “only recourse”? Of note, recent reporting suggests that the United States has launched at least one drone strike near Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, in a region readily accessible to law enforcement officials, thereby casting doubt on official assertions that lethal targeting is used as a measure of last resort, when capture is not feasible.62 Moreover, “signature strikes” reportedly were approved for use in Yemen in 2012, allowing the targeting of individuals or groups based on their pattern of activities without knowing the specific targets’ identities or roles in the organization—a practice that seems to belie a policy of individualized assessments of “significant threat.”6

#### AND-Meets Obama’s definition

Sledge 13 Matt Sledge is Huffington Post Staff, “Drone 'Signature Strike' Witness Responds To Obama Speech: 'I Don't Trust A Single Word,'” 06/19/2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/drone-signature-strike_n_3421586.html>

Such so-called "signature strikes" are one of the most controversial practices in the drone war. When first elected, President Barack Obama was highly skeptical of such attacks, begun under former President George W. Bush in 2008. With time in the Oval Office and advice from military leaders, however, Obama came to accept their use as a vital part of the fight against terrorism. Those signature strikes and their anonymous victims fall under Obama's definition of targeted killings. Unnamed U.S. officials [have told The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/politics/in-terror-shift-obama-took-a-long-path.html?pagewanted=2&src=recg) the signature strikes will continue in Pakistan. In [a major national security speech in May](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/23/obama-drone-speech-transcript_n_3327332.html), Obama acknowledged that drones sometimes make mistakes, but said their work must carry on.

#### Counter-interpretation---Targeted killing is the premeditated killing of suspected terrorist targets

Zilinskas 8 Justinas Žilinskas is Member at International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission Lithuania Education Management, “TARGETED KILLING UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,” DOA: 9-18-13, y2k

2.3. Targeted Killing 2.3.1. Two elements This term is usually applied by the governments involved [28, p. 173]. Via the introduction of this military parlance, supposing this is done so deliberately, these governments, presumably, albeit, in an implicit way, show their preference to have their action assessed under a legal regime governed by military principles or in a broader sense the laws of war, rather than have it analysed under human rights standards. This issue will be dealt with later. First a closer look will be given to the notion targeted killing as such. That notion comprises two elements: targeted and killing. First, relying again on military terminology, ‘target’ is to be seen as a specific object of attack. Consequently the action of ‘targeting’ has to be construed as the directing of operations toward the attack of a target [24, p. 609]. Second, in connection with the conjugated verbs ‘targeted’ or ‘targeting’, a variety of terms has been used, in order to explain the purpose of the action. One such example is ‘targeted thwarting’, which in fact is Israel’s favourite phrase describing its own controversial policy [29]. A designation, which seems to imply that it simply concerns foiling terrorist attempts. However, this is not always the case, since often, however fiercely denied, some kind of retaliation for past terrorists attacks, is involved as well. Furthermore that notion has been castigated for having too positive connotations in presenting the action as ‘chirurgical’, harming only the intended target [30]. In the same vein, eliciting the same critiques, Israel also refers to its policy as ‘targeted pre-emptive killings’ [25]. This would mean, striking before the terrorist can actually conduct his attempt. 2.3.2. No preconception on legality This article will use the term of targeted killing. Admittedly, the adjective ‘killing’ leaves no room for discussion as regards the purpose of the targeting. As such, one could reasonably argue that, the term ‘execution’ in the notion ‘extrajudicial execution’ or the word ‘assassination’, are clear in their purpose as well, the taking of a life. However, there is a difference from the legal perspective. For instance as regards assassination certain learned voices have considered that killing terrorists during armed conflict is a lawful exercise of military activity, and therefore no assassination. This contention is merely bypassing difficult legal questions of combatant status and issues of perfidy, both to be determined under the rules of international humanitarian law [31, p. 875]. Beyond the context of war, killing of terrorists has been considered lawful, and thus according to that view is not peacetime assassination [6, p. 280]. Bringing in mind again that the latter concerns the removing of political leaders for political purposes, one could argue that indeed, terrorists are figures evidently outside any political hierarchy. Does this mean, however, that there is no political purpose at all? The underlying problem is that it has been notoriously difficult to define the concepts of terrorists or ‘terrorism’. Nevertheless, there have been various attempts. One example describes terrorism as ‘the deliberate causing of death, or other serious injury, to civilians for political or ideological ends’ [28, p. 175]. From this it follows that terrorists are largely viewed as such due to their political engagement. Hence, the argument that their elimination is apolitical and therefore not assassination is of dubious merit [6, p. 280]. It should be clear that stating that a certain killing does not constitute assassination, whether it is during wartime or peacetime, immediately implies that this killing is legal. By contrast, targeted killing is not laden with some kind of pre-formed understanding of legality or non-legality, as is the case with the notions of ‘assassination’ or ‘extrajudicial killing’. Thus from a legal perspective there is a conceptual difference between targeted killing on the one hand and other forms such as extrajudicial execution or assassination on the other hand. We contend that the legality of eliminating or killing a terrorist, applying methods as exemplified in the first part of this article, should not merely be derived from semantics, and subsequent preconception on legality, but from an objective and profound analysis under international law. However, before establishing the framework for such a legal assessment, a tangible working definition of targeted killing is required. Literature does not provide a commonly accepted definition. For instance, it has been defined as ‘the intentional slaying of a group or individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval’ [29]. Yet, in our view this definition is falling short of two major elements. Firstly, it should contain reference to the actual targets, namely persons suspected of terrorism. Secondly, it lacks reference to the fact that in the examples given above there was premeditation associated with ‘targeted killings’ [6, p. 280]. In the article at hand the definition of targeted killing to be applied is the following: ‘the premeditated killing of a specific target (person/persons) suspected of terrorism, with explicit or implicit governmental approval’.

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### 1) Signature strikes are the core aff---their interpretation over-limits and jacks aff ground.

Heller 12 Kevin Heller is Senior Lecturer @ Melbourne Law School, “‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’: Signature Strikes and International Law,” Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 634, DOA: 8-21-13, y2k

The available evidence indicates that the vast majority of drone strikes conducted by the CIA have been signature strikes,5 as opposed to ‘personality strikes’ – those in which the CIA has a ‘high degree of confidence’ that it knows the precise identity of the target.6 In 2010, for example, Reuters reported that of the 500 ‘militants’ killed by drones between 2008 and 2010, only 8% were the kind ‘top-­‐tier militant targets’ or ‘mid-­‐to-­‐high-­‐level organizers’ whose identities could have been known prior to being killed.7 Similarly, in 2011, a U.S. official revealed that the U.S. had killed ‘twice as many “wanted terrorists” in signature strikes than in personality strikes’.8 The U.S.’s intense reliance on signature strikes has been heavily criticized by human-­‐rights groups, by politicians, and by government officials. A recent Stanford/NYU report on drone strikes in Pakistan described the legality of signature strikes as ‘heavily suspect’.9 Twenty-­‐six members of Congress, both Democrat and Republican, sent a letter to President Obama in June 2012 demanding more information about signature strikes, claiming that they ‘raise the risk of innocent civilians…. being killed’ and could ‘generate powerful and endearing anti-­‐American sentiment.10 And Dennis Blair, Obama’s former director of national intelligence, has publicly claimed that the large number of people killed in signature strikes reminds him ‘of body counts in Vietnam’.11

#### AND- Even if we add a few more cases, eliminating the core aff is worse---undermines topic ground and education for both sides.

#### 2) Limits explosion is inevitable---definition of targeted killing doesn’t exist---you should prefer real-world and contextual interpretation.

Sell 12 Daniel Sell, B.A. in History, Capital University, 2004; M.A. in Slavic & East European Studies, The Ohio State

University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, Capital University Law School, May 2013, “The United States’ Policy of Targeted Killing and the Use of Force: Another Exception to the United Nation’s Use of Force Regime, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167770>, DOA: 9-16-13, y2k

A. Defining “Targeted Killing” One overarching problem that exists when writing on targeted killing is terminology. This is clearly a problem as it is of the utmost important that readers understand what this article aims to determine. Without knowing what targeted killing refers to, readers will naturally be lost. First, as there is no all-encompassing law in the field of international law that speaks to targeted killing16, it is not possible simply to look to the law for a definition. Nowhere do laws specifically deal with how targeted killing is supposed to be viewed within an international legal framework.17 It is not as simple as saying that torture is outlawed throughout the world.18 Second, “targeted killing” is not the only term used to refer to this conduct.19 For example, numerous other terms are interchangeably used to refer to the conduct of targeted killing.20 Some of these interchangeable phrases include “extrajudicial killings,” “extrajudicial executions,” and “assassinations.”21 However, these terms are not the best definitions for state-sponsored acts of targeted killing.22 Moreover, some have argued that targeted killing has merely become a euphemism for assassination.23 Such claims only serve to cloud further targeted killing’s definition by linking two completely separate terms into one. Thus, it becomes paramount to define “targeted killing” as used in this article so that readers are not led astray. Moreover, it is important to define the term as “targeted killings are no longer novel.”24 It is almost ironic that academics are noting that targeted killings are no longer novel, but a solid definition of the term is hard to come by. The following sections will first provide a definition of targeted killing. The second section will look at the problem of interchangeable terms, by looking at the term “assassination.” Finally, the last section will look at why targeted killing and interchangeable terms, such as assassination, are in fact different. This will hopefully inform readers as to specifically what conduct is being analyzed in this article. 1. Targeted Killing As mentioned, the main problem in defining targeted killing is that there is no statutory definition of this term.25 Moreover, “[t]here is no generally accepted definition do exist in order to determine which definition is best, or create one definition based on the several variants. However, it should be first noted that this term came into common usage in 2000.27 Israel has used this term “to describe one of the means it uses to combat what it labels as terrorist attacks directed against its citizens.”28 This term is useful as it “accurately refers to what the Israelis actually do.”29 This term is also useful for the United States as it certainly explains the policy of the United States government.30 Additionally, another issue to consider in defining targeted killing is that the policy is used in various contexts and employs the use of different means and methods.31 As the United Nations has noted, “[t]argeted killings . . . take place in a variety of contexts and may be committed by governments and their agents in times of peace as well as armed conflict, or by organized armed groups in armed conflict.”32 As concerns the methods used, they may “include sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison.”33

#### AND- that means literature checks---creates a functional limit because US targeted killing policy inevitably involves signature strikes and teams won’t read un-strategic affs like special ops or political assasinations.

#### Competing interpretation is bad---reasonability is key to check race-to-bottom and substance crowd-out

## 2AC Executive CP

#### Object fiat is voting issue---no literature base exists for Obama restraining himself---justifies utopian that jacks aff’s ability to generate solvency deficit due to lack of comparative solvency evidence and allow for infinite number CPs that are not predictable---fiating out of solvency deficit kills fairness.

#### Perm do both

#### Congress key---Certain policies from Congress is necessary to check Executive over-reach by stamping specific action as illegal---allows more control---only that solves global signal because other countries don’t view the prez as credible.

#### CP gets rolled-back

Eland 13 Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore. “Obama’s New Restricted War on Terror Is Unlikely to Be Lasting,” 5-30-13, <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=4626>, DOA: 8-13-13, y2k

Prior to the 2012 election, President Obama told aides that he wanted to institutionalize the ad hoc war on terror, thus shaping it for years to come whether he was re-elected or a successor took over, according to the New York Times. This desire led to the recent presidential speech at the National Defense University that pledged to cut back on the use of drone strikes, targeting only those terrorists who threaten the United States, and to remove the CIA from the targeted killing (read: assassination) business. The new stated policy is a welcome alternative to the prior Bush/Obama policy of endless war against every radical Islamist. But as the Times correctly noted, whether the new stated policy will live up to the hype is uncertain, given the internal compromises made in developing the doctrine and the resultant fuzzy language. More important, indications are that even if the new policy lives up to its lofty goals, it will still not be enough and will probably not constrain future presidents. The criteria for targeting terror suspects with drones outside war zones has been restricted from those who are a “significant threat to U.S. interests” to those who pose a “continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons” and the killing of whom would almost certainly avoid civilian carnage. Of course, “continuing” and “imminent” in the same phrase are contradictory and illustrate the continuing problem with the war on terror. It is clear from the U.S. Constitution’s wording and the debates surrounding its creation at the Constitutional Convention that Congress is supposed to approve even minor military actions—through letters of marque and reprisal—unless the country is imminently in danger. Even in this latter case, if the president acts militarily, he should get congressional approval after the immediate danger has passed. So Congress should bless any “continuing” military action against even a lowly terrorist foe. Because both George W. Bush and Obama have run unauthorized drone attacks outside the formal war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan (the authorization to use military force [AUMF] in the latter case only allows military strikes against those who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks or harbored the attackers) in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the new doctrine only limits the constitutional infringement rather than ending it. In addition, because the CIA fought tenaciously for its turf, the transition of the drone campaign in Pakistan from agency to military control has been delayed indefinitely. So the change here may yet turn out to be an empty promise. Also, “signature strikes”—the targeting of unidentified armed men only presumed to be terrorists—in Pakistan will still be allowed, thus seemingly negating the aforementioned policy to ensure that innocent civilians are not killed. Even if drone strikes are eventually transferred from the CIA to the Pentagon, however, it may be important only in the minds of Washington’s politicians and bureaucrats, rather than effecting the implied improvement in transparency. After all, military operations can be as secretive as CIA operations. And the Presidential Policy Guidance containing all of the above new restrictions and changes remains classified, so the American public is still in the dark about the details of the still illegal and unconstitutional wars its chief executive is running. But for a moment, let’s give the administration the benefit of the doubt that a more restrictive war on terror will actually result from the president’s speech. One objective of the change in policy is to restrict the actions of future administrations against suspected terrorists, or as the New York Times quoted one White House aide, “We have to set standards so it doesn’t get abused in the future.” What the aide was really claiming was that the Obama administration could abuse the Constitution responsibly but such contravention of the document by future administrations (especially Republican ones) would likely not be so benign. Yet American history shows that once a precedent for constitutional abuse is set—usually during a crisis—it may lie dormant for years, decades, or even centuries and then be dragged out again. Some examples should illustrate the point. Abraham Lincoln unconstitutionally suspended habeas corpus (jailing people without allowing them to challenge their incarceration) during the Civil War (the Constitution permits only the Congress to do so under conditions of invasion or rebellion). Ulysses Grant, as president, followed Lincoln’s bad precedent during Reconstruction. Almost a century-and-a-half later, George W. Bush resurrected the unconstitutional practice during the war on terror. For most of American history, Congress approved important military actions with a declaration of war. During the Korean War, Harry Truman euphemistically called it a “police action” and unconstitutionally failed to seek such a declaration. A decade-and-a-half later, Lyndon B. Johnson, following Truman’s bad precedent, chose to substitute a vaguely worded congressional Gulf of Tonkin resolution for a formal declaration and then exploited the resolution to secretly escalate the Vietnam War. Ever since Truman’s precedent, Congress has constitutionally declared none of the United States’ periodic major wars. The income tax was unconstitutionally created and used by Lincoln to raise revenues for the Civil War. The tax was resurrected in the late 1800s, only for the Supreme Court to properly declare it unconstitutional. A constitutional amendment was then passed during the first part of the 20th century to again revive and make legal the hated tax. These examples illustrate the resiliency of even dormant presidential precedents. So even if Obama’s somewhat laudable, but long overdue, restriction of the war on terror is effected, it may not prevent abuses by future presidents, who will cite the earlier expansive Bush/Obama war on terror as their unfortunate precedent.

#### Executive action isn’t perceived as credible

Goldsmith 13 Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003. Professor Goldsmith is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security, “Why the Administration Needs to Get Congress on Board for Its Stealth War,” 3-7-13, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/why-the-administration-needs-to-get-congress-on-board-for-its-stealth-war/> DOA: 9-12-13, y2k

There is a connection between Senator Paul’s filibuster and the need for a comprehensive renewal of presidential authorities for the administration’s stealth counterterrorism tactics (i.e., the cluster of tactics that include “covert action, Special Forces, drone surveillance and targeting, cyberattacks and other stealthy means deployed in many countries”). Steve’s latest post helps draw the connection. I agree with Steve that the Administration would be benefit from less secrecy about its drone program – I have said so many times, and I said so in my post. I also don’t begrudge Senator Paul trying to make the administration open up more, though (as I said in my post) I think he should do so without grossly distorting the administration’s positions. (The filibuster was premised on the demand that the administration acknowledge that it lacked the authority to target a non-combatant U.S. citizen in the United States – something that the Attorney General had done earlier in the day, albeit in his typically roundabout and unclear fashion.) I disagree with Steve’s claim that we don’t know how the government conceives of its authority or the limits on it. The administration has told us a lot about that – in speeches, papers, leaks, and more, though of course it could give us much more detail. Steve correctly says we needn’t trust the government’s words. But note that Steve’s proposed remedy is “a more comprehensive public defense by the Executive Branch.” To which one can ask: Why should we trust the words of a more comprehensive public defense? Public skepticism about the administration’s drone program has grown in step with its public defenses. I think the administration made a big mistake in thinking that unilateral disclosures alone — in speeches, white papers, controlled leaks to authors and journalists, and other “public defenses” – would legitimate its policies. The reason is precisely what Steve puts his finger on: Outsiders needn’t trust Executive branch representations, and over time they won’t trust its representations if that is all the information they have on a matter they care about, especially on an issue as fraught as executive authority to kill an American citizen. This is where separations of powers can help. One way to make the president’s secret actions and decisions and authorities legitimate and credible is to have an adversarial institution look at and pass on them. GTMO detentions became more legitimate and less controversial after another branch of government, the judiciary, looked at them and largely agreed with the executive’s assessment. I don’t think judicial review is even conceivably available for most of our stealth war. But congressional review is. As I once wrote: [A] different adversarial branch of government — Congress — can play an analogous role. The congressional intelligence and arms services committees know a lot about the president’s targeting policies, and have gone along with the president’s actions. These committees could (without revealing sensitive information) do more to enhance the president’s credibility by stating publicly — and preferably in a bipartisan fashion — that they have monitored the president’s high-value targeting decisions and find them, and the facts and processes on which they are based, to be sound. Having the intelligence committees publicly on board helps, but what the administration really needs now is to have Congress on board. The only way to legitimate the administration’s stealth war tactics, and to stop the growing bipartisan sniping at and distrust of them (which will only grow and grow if not addressed), is to make Congress vote on them and get behind them. The administration should ask for a comprehensive authorization for the tactics it is now deploying in the “war on terrorism.” I know, this approach is risky; secrets can spill out; Congress might give too much or too little authority; and the administration will be tagged with the legacy of making war permanent. There are plenty of excuses for not forging congressional approval, all of them premised on short-term thinking and a remarkable paucity of executive branch leadership. At some point soon the pain of not engaging Congress will be greater than the pain of engaging Congress, and at that point the administration will wish it had gone to Congress sooner.

#### Links to politics – immense opposition to bypassing debate

Hallowell 13 Billy Hallowell, writer for The Blaze, B.A. in journalism and broadcasting from the College of Mount Saint Vincent in Riverdale, New York and an M.S. in social research from Hunter College in Manhattan, “HERE’S HOW OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS” Feb. 11, 2013, <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamas-using-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-process-plus-a-brief-history-of-executive-orders/>

“In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities to legislate are few and far between,” Howell said. “So presidents have powerful incentive to go it alone. And they do.”¶ And the political opposition howls.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in particular, Obama is “abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress.”¶ The Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara.¶ “For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive power,” Woolley said. “It tends to have a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming from the incumbent president’s opponents.”

#### Transparency is irrelevant

Amnesty International 13 is a Nobel Peace Prize-winning grassroots activist organization with more than 3 million supporters, activists and volunteers in more than 150 countries campaigning for human rights worldwide. The organization investigates and exposes abuses, educates and mobilizes the public, and works to protect people wherever justice, freedom, truth and dignity are denied. “Drone Transparency Not Enough; Obama Must Follow the Law,” 3-6-13, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/drone-transparency-not-enough-obama-must-follow-the-law>, doa: 11-15-13, Y2K

(WASHINGTON, D.C.) – Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International USA's Security with Human Rights campaign, issued the following in response to Attorney General Eric Holder's appearance today in front of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee: "At today's hearing, we heard from Attorney General Holder that President Barack Obama is aware of the concerns about transparency with respect to the administration's drone strike policy, and that the president will address the issue in the coming months. "Transparency is long overdue and very important - but it is not the end goal. The end goal is to make sure no person - U.S. citizen or anyone else - is killed outside the bounds of the law and to ensure accountability for any killings found to be unlawful. "The information already available about the administration's 'targeted killing' gives grounds to conclude that the Obama administration's drone policy and its implementation disregard international protections for the right to life and the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of life. In some cases, the policy appears to allow for unlawful killings referred to in human rights terms as 'extrajudicial executions.' "To make sure no person is unlawfully killed, President Obama must waste no more time and publicly commit to following the 'rule book' that already exists for the use of lethal force: international human rights law and, in the exceptional circumstances where it applies, international humanitarian law as well. "Congress must make sure this happens. The Senate Judiciary Committee was right to press Attorney General Holder on drones today and to schedule a hearing about drones for March 20th. However the scope of that hearing must expand to address the use of force outside of the United States and include testimony from survivors of drone strikes and independent experts in international human rights and humanitarian law."

#### Contradictory conditional advocacy are voting issue---you can’t say violence is bad and say we should kill the terrorists---destroys 2AC strategic flexibility---either you moot our offense or we have to double-turn---kills fairness and education in debate---not reciprocal which justifies aff condo and abusive permutations---reject the team to set a precedent---non-contradicting condo solves your offense.

#### Prolif causes Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Global Post 12 “Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war,” 10-23-12, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war>, DOA: 7-20-13, y2k

27 years off and on over the past three decades. “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment." Azerbaijan refused to issue accreditation to GlobalPost’s correspondent to enter the country to report on the shootings and Azerbaijan’s military modernization. Flush with cash from energy exports, Azerbaijan has increased its annual defense budget from an estimated $160 million in 2003 to $3.6 billion in 2012. SIPRI said in a report that largely as a result of its blockbuster drone deal with Israel, Azerbaijan’s defense budget jumped 88 percent this year — the biggest military spending increase in the world. Israel has long used arms deals to gain strategic leverage over its rivals in the region. Although difficult to confirm, many security analysts believe Israel’s deals with Russia have played heavily into Moscow’s suspension of a series of contracts with Iran and Syria that would have provided them with more advanced air defense systems and fighter jets. Stephen Blank, a research professor at the United States Army War College, said that preventing arms supplies to Syria and Iran — particularly Russian S-300 air defense systems — has been among Israel’s top goals with the deals. “There’s always a quid pro quo,” Blank said. “Nobody sells arms just for cash.” In Azerbaijan in particular, Israel has traded its highly demanded drone technology for intelligence arrangements and covert footholds against Iran. In a January 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat reported that in a closed-door conversation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev compared his country’s relationship with Israel to an iceberg — nine-tenths of it is below the surface. More from GlobalPost: Are Iran's drones coordinating attacks in Syria? Although the Jewish state and Azerbaijan, a conservative Muslim country, may seem like an odd couple, the cable asserts, “Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s geopolitical difficulties, and both rank Iran as an existential security threat.” Quarrels between Azerbaijan and Iran run the gamut of territorial, religious and geo-political disputes and Tehran has repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the country over its support for secular governance and NATO integration. In the end, “Israel’s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country and as a market for military hardware,” the diplomatic cable reads. But, while these ties had indeed remained below the surface for most of the past decade, a series of leaks this year exposed the extent of their cooperation as Israel ramped up its covert war with the Islamic Republic. In February, the Times of London quoted a source the publication said was an active Mossad agent in Azerbaijan as saying the country was “ground zero for intelligence work.” This came amid accusations from Tehran that Azerbaijan had aided Israeli agents in assassinating an Iranian nuclear scientist in January. Then, just as Baku had begun to cool tensions with the Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy magazine published an article citing Washington intelligence officials who claimed that Israel had signed agreements to use Azerbaijani airfields as a part of a potential bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites. Baku strongly denied the claims, but in September, Azerbaijani officials and military sources told Reuters that the country would figure in Israel’s contingencies for a potential attack against Iran. "Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling," Rasim Musabayov, a member of the Azerbiajani parliamentary foreign relations committee told Reuters. “I think their plan includes some use of Azerbaijan access. We have (bases) fully equipped with modern navigation, anti-aircraft defenses and personnel trained by Americans and if necessary they can be used without any preparations." He went on to say that the drones Israel sold to Azerbaijan allow it to “indirectly watch what's happening in Iran.” More from GlobalPost: Despite modern facade, Azerbaijan guilty of rights abuses According to SIPRI, Azerbaijan had acquired about 30 drones from Israeli firms Aeronautics Ltd. and Elbit Systems by the end of 2011, including at least 25 medium-sized Hermes-450 and Aerostar drones. In October 2011, Azerbaijan signed a deal to license and domestically produce an additional 60 Aerostar and Orbiter 2M drones. Its most recent purchase from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) in March reportedly included 10 high altitude Heron-TP drones — the most advanced Israeli drone in service — according to Oxford Analytica. Collectively, these purchases have netted Azerbaijan 50 or more drones that are similar in class, size and capabilities to American Predator and Reaper-type drones, which are the workhorses of the United States’ campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although Israel may have sold the drones to Azerbaijan with Iran in mind, Baku has said publicly that it intends to use its new hardware to retake territory it lost to Armenia. So far, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet is not armed, but industry experts say the models it employs could carry munitions and be programmed to strike targets. Drones are a tempting tool to use in frozen conflicts, because, while their presence raises tensions, international law remains vague at best on the legality of using them. In 2008, several Georgian drones were shot down over its rebel region of Abkhazia. A UN investigation found that at least one of the drones was downed by a fighter jet from Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping presence in the territory. While it was ruled that Russia violated the terms of the ceasefire by entering aircraft into the conflict zone, Georgia also violated the ceasefire for sending the drone on a “military operation” into the conflict zone. The incident spiked tensions between Russia and Georgia, both of which saw it as evidence the other was preparing to attack. Three months later, they fought a brief, but destructive war that killed hundreds. The legality of drones in Nagorno-Karabakh is even less clear because the conflict was stopped in 1994 by a simple ceasefire that halted hostilities but did not stipulate a withdrawal of military forces from the area. Furthermore, analysts believe that all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be longer and more difficult to contain than the five-day Russian-Georgian conflict. While Russia was able to quickly rout the Georgian army with a much superior force, analysts say that Armenia and Azerbaijan are much more evenly matched and therefore the conflict would be prolonged and costly in lives and resources. Blank said that renewed war would be “a very catastrophic event” with “a recipe for a very quick escalation to the international level.” Armenia is militarily allied with Russia and hosts a base of 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. After the summer’s border clashes, Russia announced it was stepping up its patrols of Armenian airspace by 20 percent. Iran also supports Armenia and has important business ties in the country, which analysts say Tehran uses as a “proxy” to circumvent international sanctions. Blank said Israel has made a risky move by supplying Azerbaijan with drones and other high tech equipment, given the tenuous balance of power between the heavily fortified Armenian positions and the more numerous and technologically superior Azerbaijani forces. If ignited, he said, “[an Armenian-Azerbaijani war] will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”

#### Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict causes World War III and great-power escalation

Cecire 12 Michael Hikari Cecire is a Black Sea and Eurasia regional analyst and an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Azerbaijan-Armenia Tensions: Regional Risks, Policy Challenges," 6-12-12, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12046/azerbaijan-armenia-tensions-regional-risks-policy-challenges>, DOA: 7-20-12, y2k

With U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on a tour of the South Caucasus last week, hopes that Washington’s top diplomat could use the visit as an opportunity to push for regional peacemaking and democracy support were quickly overcome by events on the ground, underscoring the region’s volatility. Though Clinton’s meetings in Georgia were mostly low key, the brittle cease-fire between arch-nemeses Azerbaijan and Armenia was sorely tested by a series of clashes, fueling fears that another Caucasus war was in the offing. Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia have been rocky since the two former Soviet republics fought a war in the early 1990s over the disputed territory of Nargorno-Karabakh, a region largely settled by ethnic Armenians that is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. When large-scale fighting ended in 1994, Armenian forces -- with assistance from geopolitical patron Russia -- had driven out Azerbaijani troops as well as ethnic Azeri communities from the province. Since then, Armenia has supported the unrecognized, separatist quasi-statelet of Nagorno-Karabakh, and international efforts to peaceably resolve the conflict have fallen short, leading to frequent descriptions of the dispute as a “frozen conflict.” The conflict has been anything but frozen on the ground, however, and the dispute remains at constant risk of spiraling out of control. Though clashes are not uncommon along the line of contact, as the unofficial border between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan is known, last week’s fighting had all the appearances of a series of escalations cascading out of control. Notably, skirmishes not only took place along the line of contact, but also at the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan proper, a development that raised fears of the conflict heating up. “The implication is that, on one side or both, there was a degree of regional-level coordination by military commanders and a willingness to test the defenses of the other side across a wide swathe of territory,” wrote regional analyst Alex Jackson. “This expansion of the battlefield marks a serious escalation.” For Washington, the situation, difficult enough on its face, also presents a deeply challenging conundrum to U.S. policy in the region. Though the U.S. continues to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, Armenia’s relatively large and politically active diaspora in the United States has cultivated significant goodwill in the U.S. Congress and can count on considerable support. Washington also engages Nagorno-Karabakh through a series of diplomatic and exchange programs, including a modest but symbolically significant aid allotment. And until 2001, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act banned direct aid to Azerbaijan. The law is still on the books, but it has been waived annually since 2001. Despite the growing influence of the Armenian-American lobby in Washington, it is understood that Armenia itself remains a crucial component of Russia’s regional alliance system. Russia was a key ally during the war against Azerbaijan, and it continues to maintain a significant troop presence on Armenian soil. It also owns approximately 80 percent of the country’s energy system and is the country’s most important economic partner through trade and remittances. Though Russia has shrewdly increased its engagement toward Azerbaijan in recent years, including through energy contracts and arms sales, the Baku-Moscow relationship remains fragile and more pragmatic than friendly. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has a powerful friendship with regional power and NATO member Turkey, which broke relations and closed its borders with Armenia in 1993 out of solidarity with its Turkic cousins. (Turkey and Armenia have never established diplomatic relations.) In 2010, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a mutual defense treaty, obligating Turkey to intervene should Azerbaijan be attacked. Further complicating matters for Washington, Armenia maintains strong economic and political ties with Iran, while relations between Iran and fellow Shiite-majority Azerbaijan are increasingly tense. Meanwhile, Baku’s relations with Israel are robust and growing. Azerbaijan’s poor human rights and democracy record compared to Armenia’s -- which, though poor on its own merits, is consistently scored better on international assessments -- adds the final wrinkle for U.S. policymakers. The potential for loss of life and damage in a renewed hot war between Azerbaijan and Armenia is significant, but the real danger is the threat of regional escalation. With so many moving parts, any conflict risks turning into a conflagration with Turkey and Azerbaijan on one side and Armenia and Russia on the other. Add the wild cards of Iran -- which sees Azerbaijan’s existence as a challenge to its sovereignty over its own large ethnic-Azeri population -- and Israel to the mix and the prospect of multiple conflicts overlapping and fusing into a larger regional conflict becomes frighteningly plausible. The U.S. would be hard-pressed to stay neutral in such a scenario. Despite the obvious threat such a war poses to Eurasian security, little has been done to rein in the bellicose rhetoric and border sparring on both sides. With a population still smarting from the “shame” of defeat in the 1990s, Azerbaijan’s leaders are under domestic pressure to resolve the conflict to its advantage, which explains Baku’s hydrocarbon-fueled military buildup. With so much at stake, the West must move proactively to prevent what increasingly seems like an inevitable conflict. Current avenues for conflict prevention and negotiations, in particular the OSCE’s Minsk Group, co-chaired by the United States, Russia and France, need to be empowered to ensure that de-escalation measures such as the 2007 Madrid Principles are fulfilled. With Russia taking a defensive posture to recent fighting and progress implementing the Madrid Principles stalled, Azerbaijan may feel it has no choice but to resort to extreme measures to push the principals to re-engage diplomatically on the issue. The U.S. should use its influence in Baku and Ankara, in coordination with Russia, to pull the situation back from the brink. In 2008, another little-known frozen conflict in the South Caucasus went hot, resulting in the Russia-Georgia War over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unless tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh can be cooled down quickly, the world risks another such war, but one with far greater potential for escalation and great-power intervention.

## 2AC Iran

#### Sanctions are inevitable

Brown 11-13-2013 (Hayes. National Security Reporter/Blogger with ThinkProgress.org. Prior to joining ThinkProgress, Hayes worked as a contractor at the Department of Homeland Security. He’s been a blogger since 2011, and had his writing on international affairs appear at Foreign Policy, UN Dispatch, and the blog Gunpowder & Lead. “House Committee Pushes For More Iran Sanctions As Administration Lobbies For Time” ThinkProgress. http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/11/13/2935661/hfac-iran-sanctions/, DOA: November 14, 2013, nic)

The House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday relentlessly grilled witnesses on the need for new sanctions against Iran, even as the White House works to convince the Senate to delay implementing a new set of embargoes. The hearing — titled “Examining Nuclear Negotiations: Iran After Rouhani’s First 100 Days” — was designed to delve into the current state of play with Iran after the inauguration of Iranian president Hassan Rouhani in August. **Republicans and Democrats alike charged that little had changed since then,** attacking **the Obama administration** for the increased outreach between Washington and Tehran in the weeks since Rouhani took office. “**Only when the Iranian regime is forced to decide between economic collapse or its rush to develop its nuclear weapons capability do we have a chance to avoid that terrible outcome,”** Foreign Affairs chairman Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) said in his opening statement. The American Enterprise Institute’s Danielle Pletka and Foundation for the Defense of Democracy executive director Mark Dubowitz were on exactly on the same page as Royce throughout the hearing. “We are negotiating with people that we like,” Dubowitz said at one point about the current talks to roll back Iran’s nuclear program, “because we are negotiating with ourselves.” Pletka also said in her opening statement accused the administration of constantly moving the goal posts, ignoring Congressional sanctions in favor of offer better and better deals towards Iran. Both organizations have been leading advocates for ever harsher penalties against Iran and the use of military force sooner rather than later. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl, in contrast, warned the legislators against the escalations of sanctions on Iran at this point, saying that they could cause the current efforts at diplomacy to go “careening off the cliff.” He also cautioned against attempting to move towards maximal positions against Tehran on the basis that such maneuvering would all too likely tank any possible deal. “We have to negotiate with the enemies we have, not the enemies we want,” Kahl said. The hearing itself came after last weekend’s negotiations between the P5+1 — the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia — and Iran in Geneva ended without an agreed upon deal. While details have not been released, the framework as reported would have allowed for some limited relief of sanctions in exchange for a delay in Iran’s advancing its nuclear program, buying time for a final agreement between the parties. As a result of the perceived failure in Switzerland, the assembled congressmen with few exceptions pressed the witnesses on just why an interim deal was even necessary, let alone the terms that have been reported in the media. The vast majority also insisted that not only should existing sanctions not be rolled back before the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, but new sanctions were an absolute must. That thinking was exemplified early on in the hearing, when Ranking Member Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) — who himself takes a more hawkish position on Iran — made clear that “**while we must have a genuine openness to a diplomatic process that resolves all outstanding issues,” the Senate should still pass the House’s Iran legislation**. Engel did acknowledge that many of the details of the framework that was under discussion have yet to be revealed, making denunciations of any deal premature. “Let’s be clear, none of us were at the negotiating table,” he cautioned his colleagues. “So I think it would be wise for us to speak with some degree of caution until all the facts are known.” Kahl did his best to push back on incorrect assumptions both about the proposed deal and the facts surrounding the nuclear issue before having to leave prior to the hearing’s end. Earlier today, Israel claimed that the sanctions relief on the table had the potential of being worth up to $40 billion, providing Tehran an escape from approximately 40 percent of the sanctions value. Royce in his opening statement inflated that number up to $50 billion. The actual number, Kahl told the panel, was closer to $6 billion, and was designed to be reversible after the interim period should Iran prove to be unwilling to comply with the demands the West had put forward. Secretary of State John Kerry, who attended the negotiations in Geneva, is due to brief the Senate Banking Committee on the talks on Wednesday afternoon. His goal: keep committee chairman Sen. Tim Johnson (D-SD) from taking up the new sanctions legislation currently on hold in his committee. **Before the last round of talks began, the administration managed to hold Johnson off, but he has been noncommittal in public statements about whether he will continue to delay implementation**. Johnson’s counterpart in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) seems to have no such qualms, telling ABC’s This Week on Sunday that the U.S. should proceed forward with examining new sanctions as planned.

#### Obama has no PC AND Health care thumps

Shear, New York Times Staff Writer, 11-16, 2013,

(Michael D., "As troubles pile up, a crisis of confidence for Obama", New York Times, PAS) Accessed on LexisNexis 11-16-13

Barack Obama won the presidency by exploiting a political environment that overwhelmed George W. Bush in a second term. Now Mr. Obama is threatened by a similar toxic mix.¶ The disastrous rollout of his health care law not only threatens the rest of his agenda, but also raises questions about his competence in the same way that the Bush administration's botched response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 undermined any semblance of Republican efficiency.¶ But unlike Mr. Bush, who faced confrontational but occasionally cooperative Democrats, Mr. Obama is battling a Republican opposition that has refused to open the door to any legislative fixes to the health care law and has blocked him at virtually every turn. A contrite-sounding Mr. Obama repeatedly blamed himself on Thursday for the failed health care rollout, which he acknowledged had thrust difficult burdens on his political allies and hurt Americans' trust in him.¶ ''It's legitimate for them to expect me to have to win back some credibility on this health care law in particular and on a whole range of these issues in general,'' he said. The president did not admit to misleading people about whether they could keep their health insurance but again expressed regret that his assurances turned out to be wrong.¶ ''To those Americans, I hear you loud and clear,'' Mr. Obama said as he announced changes intended to allow some people to keep their insurance.¶ Earning back the confidence of Americans, as Mr. Obama pledged to do, will require him to right more than just the health care law, whose implementation has also been plagued by problems with the website meant to help people compare and buy insurance plans. At home, the president's immigration overhaul is headed for indefinite delay, and new budget and debt fights loom. Overseas, revelations of spying by the National Security Agency have infuriated allies, and negotiations over Iran's nuclear arsenal have set off bipartisan criticism.¶ For the first time in Mr. Obama's presidency, surveys suggest that his reserve of good will from the public is running dry. Two polls in recent weeks have reported that a majority of Americans no longer trust the president or believe that he is being honest with them.¶ The difficulties have put Mr. Obama on the defensive at exactly the moment he might have seized political advantage in a dysfunctional Washington. If not for the health care disaster, the two-week shutdown of the government last month would have been an opportunity for Mr. Obama to sharpen the contrast with Republicans. Democratic lawmakers expressed growing frustration with the opportunities the party has missed to hammer home the ideological differences between the two parties.¶ Republicans readily made the Hurricane Katrina comparison. ''The echoes to the fall of 2005 are really eerie,'' said Peter D. Feaver, a top national security official in Mr. Bush's second term. ''Katrina, which is shorthand for bungled administration policy, matches to the rollout of the website.'' Looking back, he said, ''we can see that some of the things that we hoped were temporary or just blips turned out to be more systemic from a political sense. It's a fair question of whether that's happening to President Obama.''

#### PC not key to Iran

Jennifer Rubin 11/11 is writes the Right Turn blog for The Washington Post, “On Iran, Congress should stand with France,” 11-11-13, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/11/11/on-iran-congress-should-stand-with-france/> DOA: 11-14-13, y2k

The near-disaster at Geneva represents a foreign policy challenge for both parties. Republicans and Democrats who understand the gravity of the president’s dangerous gambit to try to trade sanctions for Iranian promises, against the wishes of allies, have a unique opportunity to course correct American policy. Usually the executive reigns supreme in matters of foreign policy, especially when it comes to diplomatic negotiations. But several factors have shattered the president’s preeminence. First, Congress has already played a major role as instigator of sanctions. Second, in the Syria fiasco and now with Geneva, the administration has revealed itself to be irresolute if not downright dishonest about its “redlines” and hence unworthy of the public’s blind trust. Third, the president is a greatly diminished figure, already tanking in the polls and taking positions that threaten the Democrats’ majority in the Senate. What, then, can troubled D’s and R’s do? At the top of the list must be the passage of banking sanctions. The House has already passed its bill; the Senate mark-up is set for this week. The Senate should aim for quick and if possible unanimous passage. A top U.S. negotiator, Wendy Sherman, promised Congress if negotiators didn’t get a deal they’d be back encouraging Congress. That was untrue, as is virtually everything the Obama team has to say, but the rationale (since dropped) is correct: Sanctions, ever tightening and paralyzing to the Iranian economy, are the only way to avoid either military action or a nuclear-armed Iran. Then let the White House decide to veto it, if they are so certain that relaxing sanctions are the way to go. It is important for opponents of the Iran give-away to rally public opinion, debunk dishonest claims by the administration and demonstrate that this is an issue of grave concern to both Democrats and Republicans. Take for example a statement put out this weekend by the 500,000-strong Concerned Women for America, a religious conservative group that has adopted support for Israel as one of its key issues, which reads in part: Any weakening ultimately diminishes the chances of stopping Iran’s march towards nuclear arms proliferation. Although a ‘deal’ of some sort, regardless of its legitimate ability to halt Iran’s nuclear weaponization, would be politically helpful to the Obama Administration’s increasingly tarnished reputation, it could have the opposite effect on long-term goals of peace in the Middle East. This is a shocking departure from multiple U.N. resolutions, our pledges to Israel, and this administration’s own stated policy. ”Congress’s bipartisan pushback against the administration’s unilateral negotiations is proof that key congressional leaders view any lifting of sanctions – even before Iran has done anything to halt and dismantle its nuclear program – as dangerous to the nation of Israel and to the stability of the region. And, in a rare venture into foreign policy, the Republican Governors Association today released its own statement saying: “Reports that a nuclear agreement with Iran have stalled are a positive sign that common sense and security are prevailing. An agreement that reportedly allows Iran to continue manufacturing centrifuges and enriching uranium, and asks for relatively nothing in return, is a bad deal for America and Israel. As Prime Minister Netanyahu put it best, ‘Iran gives practically nothing and it gets a hell of a lot.’ Any deal that puts the interests of Iran ahead of the security of America, Israel and our other allies should be rejected.” This diplomatic near-tragedy also requires both reminding the administration of its numerous pledges to ratchet up sanctions until Iran gives up its nuclear weapons program and dispelling the false narrative/excuse Secretary of State John Kerry is peddling that Iran was the party to reject the deal. Media reports tell the actual blow-by-blow account about France’s upsetting a rash and dangerous deal cooked up by the Obama team, including Foreign Policy: The socialist government of French President François Hollande has adopted a muscular foreign policy that has put it to the right of the Obama administration on Libya, Mali, Syria and now Iran. Along the way, it has also become Israel’s primary European ally and — after the U.S. — arguably its closest friend in the world. [French Foreign Minister Laurent] Fabius, echoing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is said to have had two serious concerns with the deal. First, the agreement failed to prevent Tehran from continuing construction on its nuclear reactor at Arak. Once the facility is operational, a key part of Iran’s nuclear program would be immune to airstrikes because bombing the plant would lead to massive, deadly, radiation leaks. Fabius was also upset that the deal didn’t require Iran to reduce its stockpiles of 20% enriched uranium, which is approaching weapons-grade. The Hollande government, Fabius told French radio, would not be part of a “fool’s game.” France in fact has played a crucial role for years, recognizing during the Bush administration when the Europeans drove talks that Iran is insincere about a deal. As Foreign Policy notes, “France has also maintained ‘very good intelligence’ on Iran’s subsequent nuclear work through a large Paris-based Iranian exile community, which includes Iran’s former top atomic energy officials, including Akbar Etemad, the founding father of Iran’s nuclear program. . . The French Foreign Ministry, officials say, has a particularly knowledgeable expert on Iran’s nuclear program in Martin Briens, who used to run the department that handled nuclear negotiations with Iran and has an encyclopedic knowledge of the evolution of those talks from their beginning to the present.” Lawmakers should highlight France’s role; it is exceptional and openly confronts Kerry’s false narrative. The secretary of state’s utter lack of candor makes his ”no deal is better than a bad deal” assurance entirely unreliable. France will be under incredible pressure from the Obama team to cave, but Congress should make clear what France’s objections are and why its negotiators acted in the interests of the West. Whatever experts are available should be called to testify before the applicable Senate and House committees this week. A former U.S. official critical of the administration predicts, “The administration will now get the UK and Germany to pressure the French to cave, and the call whatever deal emerges a huge, tough-minded achievement, using French acceptance to show it must be a tough deal.” The former official suggests there is “counter pressure from the UAE and Saudis.” But Congress alone, both D’s and R’s, are uniquely positioned to hold hearings, pass sanctions, use the bully pulpit and challenge the mind-boggling conduct of Kerry and Wendy (I’ve-made-worthless-deals-with-despots-before) Sherman. Given the timeframe for the next set of talks, it can’t be stressed enough that speed, unanimity and clarity are of the utmost importance.

#### Plan’s a win

Baker 13 Peter Baker is Staff Writer @ NYT, “Pivoting From a War Footing, Obama Acts to Curtail Drones,” 5-23-13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-war-footing-obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html?pagewanted=all>, DOA: 8-24-13, y2k

WASHINGTON — Nearly a dozen years after the hijackings that transformed America, President Obama said Thursday that it was time to narrow the scope of the grinding battle against terrorists and begin the transition to a day when the country will no longer be on a war footing. Declaring that “America is at a crossroads,” the president called for redefining what has been a global war into a more targeted assault on terrorist groups threatening the United States. As part of a realignment of counterterrorism policy, he said he would curtail the use of drones, recommit to closing the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and seek new limits on his own war power. In a much-anticipated speech at the National Defense University, Mr. Obama sought to turn the page on the era that began on Sept. 11, 2001, when the imperative of preventing terrorist attacks became both the priority and the preoccupation. Instead, the president suggested that the United States had returned to the state of affairs that existed before Al Qaeda toppled the World Trade Center, when terrorism was a persistent but not existential danger. With Al Qaeda’s core now “on the path to defeat,” he argued, the nation must adapt. “Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue,” Mr. Obama said. “But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. It’s what our democracy demands.” The president’s speech reignited a debate over how to respond to the threat of terrorism that has polarized the capital for years. Republicans contended that Mr. Obama was declaring victory prematurely and underestimating an enduring danger, while liberals complained that he had not gone far enough in ending what they see as the excesses of the Bush era. The precise ramifications of his shift were less clear than the lines of argument, however, because the new policy guidance he signed remains classified, and other changes he embraced require Congressional approval. Mr. Obama, for instance, did not directly mention in his speech that his new order would shift responsibility for drones more toward the military and away from the Central Intelligence Agency. But the combination of his words and deeds foreshadowed the course he hopes to take in the remaining three and a half years of his presidency so that he leaves his successor a profoundly different national security landscape than the one he inherited in 2009. While President George W. Bush saw the fight against terrorism as the defining mission of his presidency, Mr. Obama has always viewed it as one priority among many at a time of wrenching economic and domestic challenges. “Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless ‘global war on terror,’ ” he said, using Mr. Bush’s term, “but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” “Neither I, nor any president, can promise the total defeat of terror,” he added. “We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do — what we must do — is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend.” Some Republicans expressed alarm about Mr. Obama’s shift, saying it was a mistake to go back to the days when terrorism was seen as a manageable law enforcement problem rather than a dire threat. “The president’s speech today will be viewed by terrorists as a victory,” said Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “Rather than continuing successful counterterrorism activities, we are changing course with no clear operational benefit.” Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said he still agreed with Mr. Obama about closing the Guantánamo prison, but he called the president’s assertion that Al Qaeda was on the run “a degree of unreality that to me is really incredible.” Mr. McCain said the president had been too passive in the Arab world, particularly in Syria’s civil war. “American leadership is absent in the Middle East,” he said. The liberal discontent with Mr. Obama was on display even before his speech ended. Medea Benjamin, a co-founder of the antiwar group Code Pink, who was in the audience, shouted at the president to release prisoners from Guantánamo, halt C.I.A. drone strikes and apologize to Muslims for killing so many of them. “Abide by the rule of law!” she yelled as security personnel removed her from the auditorium. “You’re a constitutional lawyer!” Col. Morris D. Davis, a former chief prosecutor at Guantánamo who has become a leading critic of the prison, waited until after the speech to express disappointment that Mr. Obama was not more proactive. “It’s great rhetoric,” he said. “But now is the reality going to live up to the rhetoric?” Still, some counterterrorism experts saw it as the natural evolution of the conflict after more than a decade. “This is both a promise to an end to the war on terror, while being a further declaration of war, constrained and proportional in its scope,” said Juan Carlos Zarate, a counterterrorism adviser to Mr. Bush. The new classified policy guidance imposes tougher standards for when drone strikes can be authorized, limiting them to targets who pose “a continuing, imminent threat to Americans” and cannot feasibly be captured, according to government officials. The guidance also begins a process of phasing the C.I.A. out of the drone war and shifting operations to the Pentagon. The guidance expresses the principle that the military should be in the lead and responsible for taking direct action even outside traditional war zones like Afghanistan, officials said. But Pakistan, where the C.I.A. has waged a robust campaign of air assaults on terrorism suspects in the tribal areas, will be grandfathered in for a transition period and remain under C.I.A. control. That exception will be reviewed every six months as the government decides whether Al Qaeda has been neutralized enough in Pakistan and whether troops in Afghanistan can be protected. Officials said they anticipated that the eventual transfer of the C.I.A. drone program in Pakistan to the military would probably coincide with the withdrawal of combat units from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Even as he envisions scaling back the targeted killing, Mr. Obama embraced ideas to limit his own authority. He expressed openness to the idea of a secret court to oversee drone strikes, much like the intelligence court that authorizes secret wiretaps, or instead perhaps some sort of independent body within the executive branch. He did not outline a specific proposal, leaving it to Congress to consider something along those lines. He also called on Congress to “refine and ultimately repeal” the authorization of force it passed in the aftermath of Sept. 11. Aides said he wanted it limited more clearly to combating Al Qaeda and affiliated groups so it could not be used to justify action against other terrorist or extremist organizations. In renewing his vow to close the Guantánamo prison, Mr. Obama highlighted one of his most prominent unkept promises from the 2008 presidential campaign. He came into office vowing to shutter the prison, which has become a symbol around the world of American excesses, within a year, but Congress moved to block him, and then he largely dropped the effort. With 166 detainees still at the prison, Mr. Obama said he would reduce the population even without action by Congress. About half of the detainees have been cleared for return to their home countries, mostly Yemen. Mr. Obama said he was lifting a moratorium he imposed on sending detainees to Yemen, where a new president has inspired more faith in the White House that he would not allow recidivism. The policy changes have been in the works for months as Mr. Obama has sought to reorient his national security strategy. The speech was his most comprehensive public discussion of counterterrorism since he took office, and at times he was almost ruminative, articulating both sides of the argument and weighing trade-offs out loud in a way presidents rarely do. He said that the United States remained in danger from terrorists, as the attacks in Boston and Benghazi, Libya, have demonstrated, but that the nature of the threat “has shifted and evolved.” He noted that terrorists, including some radicalized at home, had carried out attacks, but less ambitious than the ones on Sept. 11. “We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them,” he said. “But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.”

#### AND-That’s key to agenda

Green 10 David Michael Green is Professor of political science at Hofstra University, David Michael Green, 6/11/10, "The Do-Nothing 44th President ", http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Do-Nothing-44th-Presid-by-David-Michael-Gree-100611-648.html

Moreover, there is a continuously evolving and reciprocal relationship between presidential boldness and achievement. In the same way that nothing breeds success like success, nothing sets the president up for achieving his or her next goal better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This is absolutely a matter of perception, and you can see it best in the way that Congress and especially the Washington press corps fawn over bold and intimidating presidents like Reagan and George W. Bush. The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the psychology of power all too well. They knew that by simultaneously creating a steamroller effect and feigning a clubby atmosphere for Congress and the press, they could leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to preserve their dignities. By jumping on board the freight train, they could be given the illusion of being next to power, of being part of the winning team. And so, with virtually the sole exception of the now retired Helen Thomas, this is precisely what they did.

#### Banning signature strikes is popular

Herb 12 Jeremy Herb, congressional correspondent for the Hill, 6-13-2012, “Lawmakers want legal justification for drone strikes,” The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/232523-lawmakers-want-legal-justification-for-drone-strikes

A group of more than two dozen anti-war lawmakers wants the White House to explain the legal justification for “signature” drone strikes, in which drone attacks can be launched when the identity of those killed is not known. The Obama administration gave the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) the new authority in Yemen to target al Qaeda militants, as the administration has stepped up its drone program there this year. The House members warned in a letter to President Obama Tuesday that the “signature” strikes can generate “powerful and enduring anti-American sentiment.” “We are concerned that the use of such ‘signature’ strikes could raise the risk of killing innocent civilians or individuals who may have no relationship to attacks on the United States,” they wrote. “The implications of the use of drones for our national security are profound. They are faceless ambassadors that cause civilian deaths, and are frequently the only direct contact with Americans that the targeted communities have.” Twenty-six lawmakers who signed the letter, led by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), including anti-war Republicans Reps. Ron Paul (Texas) and Walter Jones (N.C.). The lawmakers want the White House to tell Congress the process by which signature strikes are authorized and the legal justifications for conducting them. The new signature drone attacks in Yemen, which were first reported by The Washington Post in April, has been a tactic used for drone attacks in Pakistan.

#### Logical policymaker will pass both

#### Senate will attach sanctions to the NDAA extension

AP 11/14 “Iran negotiations: John Kerry warns US Congress against passing new sanctions,” 11-14-13, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/iran-negotiations-john-kerry-sanctions>, DOA: 11-14-13, y2k

The new sanctions were overwhelmingly approved by the Republican-led House in July. The legislation blacklisted Iran's mining and construction sectors and committed the US to the goal of eliminating all Iranian oil exports worldwide by 2015. If the Senate banking committee pushes off its parallel bill any longer, lawmakers could attach it to a Senate defence bill, which could come up for debate as early as Thursday.

#### Iran won’t give up nuclear facilities

BND 9/26 “Stay skeptical of Iran’s soft sell,” <http://www.bnd.com/2013/09/26/2818690/stay-skeptical-of-irans-soft-sell.html#storylink=cpy>, DOA: 10-13-13, y2k

Obama is right that “the diplomatic path must be tested.” But is the president’s optimism justified? Rouhani has excited Iran-watchers in the West over the past several weeks with a charm offensive that has included tweeted holiday greetings to Jews, the release of some political prisoners and a Washington Post op-ed that promised a “constructive dialogue.” But there has been no substance — and there is ample reason for skepticism that a reversal of Iran’s drive to achieve nuclear weapons capability is in the works.

Iran has steadily built its capacity to enrich uranium through a decade of negotiations and escalating sanctions. Rouhani, a longtime and fiercely loyal follower of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has yet to offer any indication of what, if any, deviations the regime may be prepared to make from its previous refusal to limit that activity, accept more intrusive international inspections or answer U.N. inspectors’ questions about suspected work on warheads and missiles.

On the contrary: During his election campaign this year, Rouhani boasted that, as the regime’s nuclear negotiator a decade ago, he had managed to head off sanctions even as the program moved forward. His pitch to Iranians was that a different approach to the West, eschewing the confrontational, Holocaustdenying antics of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, might win relief from sanctions while preserving Iran’s interests.

In that sense, Obama’s assertion that “President Rouhani received from the Iranian people a mandate to pursue a more moderate course” struck us as misguided. Rouhani was in New York on Tuesday not because democracy triumphed in Iran but because Iran’s real leader decided to give the softsell strategy a try.

It’s possible that the regime could offer concessions, such as partial limits on enrichment or a reduction of its growing stockpile of enriched uranium; such steps, after all, were once proposed by Ahmadinejad. But a genuine renunciation of the capacity to build a weapon, and the acceptance of international controls that would enforce that commitment, looks far-fetched.

Iran’s nuclear program is a bluff

James Conca, 10/13/2013

Contributor, Iran’s Dangerous Nuclear Bluf, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2013/10/13/irans-dangerous-nuclear-bluff/

President Obama’s historic phone conversation with Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani sure made the meetings of the U.N. General Assembly exciting (Kurt Eichenwald, Newsweek). It’s finally calling a very serious bluff – that Iran has a nuclear weapon, or can build one quickly.¶ This is a very dangerous bluff, indeed. But it has certainly served a purpose. Countries having the bomb never seem to get attacked. But Iran doesn’t have one and is unlikely to ever get one. The only nuclear thing they have that works is a nuclear power program. When A.Q. Khan was selling nuclear weapons information, the Ayatollahs thought ramping up their nuclear infrastructure to give them some options would be a good thing, especially after the chemical weapons assaults against them during the 1980s from our old friend and ally Saddam.¶ Iran kept going on resurrecting the Bushehr civilian nuclear power project with a 1000 MW reactor, which has gone very well, and about which we don’t care at all since you can’t make bombs with it. But they also wanted to build a nuclear deterrent, as a specter if not a reality. If they never got to weapons, they’d still have nuclear power as well as their own enrichment and nuclear manufacturing capabilities. It seemed like a good strategy.¶ But things change. Old orders are falling. The region is in upheaval and Iran’s theocracy has decided that the cost/benefit of maintaining an expensive, useless nuclear program that is still a long way from producing a reliable weapon, while being starved by a barrage of sanctions, on the heels of a global economic meltdown, has now gone into the too-much-cost-and-not-enough-benefit category. It doesn’t take a genius to know when to change the game plan. The new overtures from Rouhani are real, and borne of a sufficient number of powerful men in Iran’s theocracy realizing that their survival requires maintaining their power. After all, they’re just strong-man oligarchs, not wingnuts like other rogues who shall remain nameless.¶ But let’s review the three stages to making a reliable nuclear weapon – weapons-grade material, weaponization, and delivery.¶ First, and most difficult, is the fissile (split-able) material, plutonium-239 or uranium-235. You need about 55 lbs of U-235, but only about 15 lbs of Pu-239, which is why Pu is better on missiles. Iran does not have this. North Korea does have enough Pu and has successfully tested a serviceable weapon.¶ The most difficult part of the whole process is making weapons-grade Pu-239 or U-235. You need a weapons-reactor for the first (*not* a power reactor, wrong isotopic mix among many other things) along with centrifuges (or the old-style gaseous diffusion) to make the original reactor fuel.¶ But you only need centrifuges for a U-weapon. Iran chose U as the fissile material as it is easier to just enrich, rather than produce Pu and reprocess it to sufficient purity. Besides, Khan gave them the technology for enriching U.¶ But both materials need to be almost pure, greater than 90%. I know everyone discusses 20% as a theoretical limit. 20% *is* technically highly-enriched, compared to the original 0.7% U-235 in the yellowcake produced from mining U-ore, but it needs to be >90% to be reliable in a weapon.¶ And you want it to be reliable, trust me. If you’re going to make the big decision to field a nuke, it better work. It’s why there’s so much testing associated with a weapons program.¶ But Iran doesn’t have even 20% enriched U-235. They have the ability to make it, although their centrifuges have not performed up to the level of their hype, but it seems like the rulers never decided to actually make a weapon, just to make everyone think they could

#### No prolif impact

Jones 2/18/2013 [Peter, ¶ Associate professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa Rapid nuclear proliferation doesn't happen;, LexisNexis, 7/20/2013 DMW]

It's a good narrative for those who want to attack Iran, but history shows us that bombs don't just sprout in neighbouring states¶ There is considerable historical evidence to suggest that this would not happen. If it did, it would take a long time. Talk of rapid proliferation across the region is simply not apt.¶ Since the dawn of the nuclear era, various leaders and analysts have predicted that nuclear proliferation would take place rapidly and inexorably. Those countries that could build the bomb would do so, and others would build it in response. It has been predicted that almost 50 countries would eventually join the nuclear club alongside the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¶ That prediction has proved wrong. Only four additional countries - India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea - have acquired nuclear weapons. One country unambiguously tried and was stopped (Iraq, before it was foolish enough to invade Kuwait). In each case, the reasons why these countries decided to build nuclear weapons had to do with the specifics of their security situations rather than a reflex action. This record is hardly cause for celebration but also hardly the proliferation threat so often forecast.¶ Moreover, neighbours were threatened when these countries acquired nuclear weapons but decided not to build nuclear weapons in response. Japan and South Korea did not build them after China and then North Korea did, despite chilling rhetoric from the one-party states that easily matched anything Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said about Israel. No Arab country built them after Israel did. Yes, Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, but no other country in the region has.¶ Rather than build their own bombs, most countries faced with neighbours acquiring nuclear weapons have sought alliances and protection from others - most often the United States.¶ Thus, contrary to popular wisdom, experience has been that most states do not build nuclear bombs, even when they have the opportunity and, seemingly, the motive to do so. If there is a norm of international conduct regarding nuclear weapons, it is a norm of non-proliferation. For every state that has developed nuclear weapons, there are dozens more, including Canada, that could have but did not. South Africa did but then gave them up. There are several, including Brazil, Argentina and Sweden, that went down the road toward nuclear weapons but stopped and went back. There are even a few - Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan - that inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union collapsed but soon gave them up voluntarily.¶ And yet, in the Iranian case, we continue to be captivated by an argument that widespread regional proliferation is inevitable. Why? In part, it is because of what some scholars of proliferation call a "proliferation narrative" that has gripped the majority of analysts and practitioners of international affairs.¶ This narrative, which focuses on power as the key element of international affairs, holds that nuclear weapons are the ultimate expression of power; that states seek to maximize their power; and so states, all other things being equal, will want nuclear weapons. Moreover, states facing a nuclear-armed foe will almost certainly want their own bomb. Despite decades of evidence to the contrary, this narrative continues to hold sway in large parts of the academic and practitioner communities.¶ Another reason may be that pointing to an inevitable proliferation cascade is ample justification for those who wish to attack Iran to do so. It is a powerful narrative: "Yes, an attack on Iran may be dangerous, uncertain and could lead to a regional war, but far better to try to stop the Iranians from getting the bomb before X number of other [whisper when you say this] Muslim countries across the Middle East decide to build bombs as well."¶ But would they? And could they do it quickly? Despite some musings by some members of the Saudi Royal Family, it is debatable as to whether any other Middle East country would automatically decide to build a bomb if Iran ever did. Moreover, even if other states in the region did decide to build bombs, it would take decades. Experience seems to show that most of them would eventually counter an Iranian bomb by moving even further into the security embrace of the United States - an outcome profoundly at odds with Iran's interests.¶ The idea of a rapid and inevitable proliferation cascade across the Middle East is simply not reasonable - but it works well as a scare tactic to justify a war with Iran that might otherwise be a hard sell to a war-weary American public.

#### No Iranian nuclear aggressions

Waltz 12 [Kenneth N. Waltz, is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb :Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”, Foreign Affairs, <http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf> assessed July 1,2013 LMM]

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still¶ worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act¶ more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly¶ provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record¶ of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the¶ bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them¶ a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and¶ aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear¶ weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is¶ little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a¶ high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the¶ United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries¶ can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a¶ country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over¶ its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the¶ product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed.

#### No Israeli strikes---politics have changed

Mark Landler ‘13 NYT Reporter, "A Goal for Obama in Israel: Finding Some Overlap on Iran," March 18, 2013, [www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/middleeast/obama-in-israel-visit-to-seek-common-ground-with-netanyahu-on-iran.html?pagewanted=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit\_th\_20130319](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/middleeast/obama-in-israel-visit-to-seek-common-ground-with-netanyahu-on-iran.html?pagewanted=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130319)

Some analysts believe that Mr. Obama now holds the upper hand, in part because doubts about the wisdom of a unilateral strike have grown in Israel since last year, when it was widely discussed.¶ Iran has made enough progress reinforcing its Fordo nuclear facility that it is no longer clear whether Israeli warplanes could destroy it.¶ “There has been a dramatic change in the policy views of most Israeli elites since last fall,” Mr. Kupchan said. “There is a fresh sense that there’s not as much they can do militarily.”¶ The politics in Israel, moreover, have changed. Ehud Barak, the defense minister who was a leading hawk on Iran, has left Mr. Netanyahu’s cabinet. The prime minister’s new cabinet, though not necessarily composed of doves, will need to be briefed before the ministers are likely to vote in favor of unilateral action, analysts said.

#### No US strike

Anne Applebaum 10**,** Washington Post, “Prepare for war with Iran -- in case Israel strikes”, 2-23, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022203528.html

Let's be serious for a moment: Barack **Obama will not bomb Iran.** This is not because he is a liberal, or because he is a peacenik, or because he doesn't have the guts to try and "save his presidency" in this time-honored manner, as Daniel Pipes has urged and Sarah Palin said she would like him to do.

The president will not bomb Iran's nuclear installations for precisely **the same reasons** that George W. **Bush did not bomb Iran's nuclear installations:** Because we don't know exactly where they all are, because we don't know whether such a raid could stop the Iranian nuclear program for more than a few months, and because Iran's threatened response -- against Israelis and U.S. troops, via Iranian allies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon -- isn't one we want to cope with at this moment. Nor do we want the higher oil prices that would instantly follow. **No American president** doing a sober calculation **would start a war of choice now**, while U.S. troops are actively engaged on two other fronts, and no American president could expect public support for more than a nanosecond.

#### US-pakistan relations check Iran

[Richard Javad Heydarian](http://fpif.org/author/richard-javad-heydarian/), December 23, 2011.

(foreign affairs analyst ) The Fading U.S.-Pakistan Alliance, Foreign Policy in Focus, http://fpif.org/the\_fading\_us-pakistan\_alliance/

Recent years have also witnessed an increasingly cozy relationship between Tehran and Islamabad, illustrated by a growing number of bilateral agreements and high-level diplomatic interaction. Pakistan has been visibly increasing its economic cooperation with Iran, mainly in the energy sector. The [proposed IPI pipeline](http://www.presstv.ir/detail/207115.html), which passes through Pakistan, could immensely strengthen Iran’s position in Asian gas and energy markets. This would further deepen Tehran’s influence in Central and South Asia, while ameliorating the impact of sanctions on the country’s increasingly beleaguered economy.¶ Despite [vehement U.S. opposition](http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/19-Dec-2011/Work-on-PaKIran-gasline-in-full-swing), Pakistan has decided to push through, and even hasten, the construction of its portion of the IPI pipeline, which is expected to come online by 2014. Iran could earn around $3 billion in annual revenues, while Pakistan would be able to address its growing energy needs.

## 2AC Non-Violence K

#### The role of the ballot is to decide between a topical plan and a competing policy option or the status quo – Their framework is self-serving, moots the 1AC, and destroys policy education. That’s a voter for competitive equity and education.

#### Vague or Floating PIC is inevitable [especially when they don’t tell you whether they get rid of drones] – moots the aff and stable offense impossible.

#### We impact-turn---maintaining personality strike is still necessary to prevent violence in Pakistan.

#### Technical and legal deliberation is only way for ethical policy changes---alt fails.

Mellor 13 The Australian National University, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Department Of International Relations,
“Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” European University Institute, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, DOA: 8-14-13, y2k

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

#### Ethical policymaking must be grounded in consequences

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As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but , then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Perm do both

#### Absolute rejection of drones are counter-productive---alternatives are morally worse---prefer pragmatic, middle-ground approach to counter-terror

Tooley 13 Mark Tooley is president of the Institute on Religion and Democracy. “Drone policy can be moral policy,” 8-15-13, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/wp/2013/08/15/drone-policy-can-be-moral-policy/> DOA: 8-15-13, y2k

In many cases drone critics, if not absolute pacifists, are de facto pacifists who cannot imagine a situation when lethal force is ever justified. Often they reinvent Just War into an impossible standard applicable in no real world situation. And even many religious non-pacifists imagine that Just War’s intent is entirely a restraint on force, when actually the tradition sometimes commands force in defense of the innocent and wider justice. Do drones defend the innocent and promote a wider justice? All warfare, like all human activity, is morally flawed. But demanding perfection only guarantees paralysis. Drone critics typically imagine that neutralizing terrorists is actually a conventional law enforcement challenge rather than a cause for military force. They expect or imply that increased international collaboration would compel local regimes to apprehend and lawfully detain terrorists. Ideally they would be right. But Christian ethics and most other traditional religious perspectives understand that no human behavior, least of all statecraft in pursuit of national security, can assume the ideal. The world is fallen, full of evil, human frailty, and limited capacity. The reality is that terrorist havens are usually in regions that are virtually ungoverned, like Somalia, or have local rulers unwilling or unable to take action against them, like parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. Where there is competent and willing local law enforcement, the U.S. is not launching drones. Where such law enforcement is impossible, what then? Religious critics of drones rarely offer specific alternatives. Instead, they morally fault drones for imprecision, susceptible to harming innocents, and impersonally guided by desk-bound pilots who, with their bureaucratic overlords, may be cavalier because they are themselves not at risk. The anti-drone letter from Mainline Protestants cited “remote, technical warfare,” which has the “potential to encourage overuse and extension of the policy to more countries and more perceived threats.” But almost all forms of modern warfare are “remote” and “technical.” Combatants no longer typically battle each other with swords and lances. Absent the option of effective law enforcement against terrorists, the range of options include conventional aerial bombing or cruise missiles, both of which are pretty “remote,” or a military personnel excursion similar to the U.S. Navy SEAL mission that dispatched Osama bin Laden. None of these options avoids the possibility of accidentally killing innocents. Drones may in fact be likelier to be precise. All of these options, no less than drones, enrage and terrify local populations, especially if they politically sympathize with the terrorists. And sending armed personnel onto the ground in dangerous territory obviously subjects them to possible death or capture. Unlike most religious critics of drones, the Catholic letter admitted the legitimacy of national defense against terrorism. But like other critics, it suggested counter-terrorism is “primarily a law enforcement activity,” and urged a wider “range of economic, political and diplomatic responses in order to get at the root causes and injustices that terrorists exploit.” But what to do when aid programs, diplomacy and international collaboration fail? Or what if such collaboration actually dictates drones strikes, with local regimes tacitly encouraging their use against terrorist regime opponents they cannot reach? American idealism often imagines that American power can achieve any goal with good will and sufficient exertion. But in the real world not all terrorists and their supporters can be neutralized with a subpoena, a government check, or high-minded mediation. The Christian Just War tradition is not a rigid formula with which clerics and academics badger governments with impossibly lofty standards. It’s a tool primarily for practitioners of statecraft to achieve an approximate justice with the available means in an always flawed situation. Lethal force is acceptable and sometimes morally imperative if more innocents will suffer without it. Drones that kill terrorists are among the most precise weapons ever developed. They often are morally preferable to the available alternatives. All governments are ordained to protect their people. And any government that shuns the available tools in defense of its people and in pursuit of justice has failed its vocation.

#### Non-violence impossible.

Guzzini 98 Senior Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and Associate Professor of Political Science, International Relations, and European Studies at the Central European University in Budapest, 1998, Stefano, Realism in International Relations, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

#### Pacificism is bad---threats are legitimate

Jones & Smith 9 David Martin Jones is Associate Professor @ University of Queensland—AND—M.L.R.Smith is Professor of Strategic Theory in the Department of War Studies, King's College. “We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?” 3-28-9, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:292–302, 2009, DOA: 8-29-13, y2k

In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory’s ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged. At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical postnational utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama Boston Legal Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of Critical Studies on Terrorism are its natural home

#### Russia fills in collapse of US-Pakistan relations- Leads to Russian expansionism and war with the US

Pavada 12 8/28/2012 Pakistan can make Russia Queen of Asia, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/28-08-2012/122006-pakistan\_russia-0/

The relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, despite the numerous attempts to revive them, are falling apart. Therefore, establishing close cooperation with Pakistan will give Russia a real chance to gain a foothold in Central and South Asia. In addition, Russia will be able to access the Indian Ocean, and make the U.S. troops in Afghanistan directly dependent on its logistics.¶ The constant and rude attempts of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of a nuclear power raise overt anger in this country at all levels. An opinion poll conducted by Pew Research Center (USA) in the beginning of this year showed that 74 percent of Pakistanis view the U.S. as an "enemy." Not that long ago, the whole country was discussing the scandal connected with the resignation of the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Husain Haqqani wrote a secret letter, in which he asked for help in preventing a military coup, which was allegedly plotted in Pakistan, and promised certain concessions in return.¶ But even this pro-American official said last week that the goals and priorities of the two countries would not be the same in near future. That is why, he said, the USA and Pakistan should give up their attempts to build a partnership and pay attention to their own interests instead. "If in 65 years we haven't been able to find sufficient common reasons to live together ... It may be better to find friendship outside the family ties," Haqqani told Reuters.¶ The brazen drone bombings of the Pakistani territory, the uncoordinated military operation to destroy Osama bin Laden, the accusations of supplying materials for Iran's nuclear program have prompted Pakistan to seek cooperation with Russia. A special envoy of the President of Russia visited Pakistan in May 2012. Putin himself accepted the invitation to come to Pakistan for a bilateral meeting in Islamabad, prior to the IV quadrilateral meeting on Afghanistan. The meeting is to be held in Islamabad on 26-27 September 2012 with the participation of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Russia. A new strategic partnership is brewing in the region.¶ Pakistan was one of three countries that officially recognized the power of Taliban movement in Afghanistan. There is no logic in the decision of the USA to make Pakistan its ally after 9/11. Indeed, Afghanistan and Pakistan are two brotherly nations. Ten billion dollars that the States invested in Pakistan's economy during ten years are not enough to make the country "sell and destroy itself," as Minister of Science and Technology Azam Khan Swati said.¶ In case of partnership with Pakistan, Russia could take control of the logistics of the U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. Russia already controls the Northern Distribution Network in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that border on Afghanistan. If we add the southern routes from Karachi to Chaman and Torkham, then all deliveries will have to be coordinated through the Russian-Pakistani alliance.¶ If this scenario becomes reality, Russia will obtain enormous leverage over the United States. In one fell swoop, it will remove the Mideastern loop, which can not be tightened today just because of Iran. What is more, Russia will receive access to the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea and the ports of Gwadar or Karachi and then to the Strait of Hormuz, bypassing the alliance with Iran, which is not beneficial for Russia now.¶ In addition, Pakistan has been an observer at the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization - a regional international organization, founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) since 2005. One could go further on the geopolitical level, and make the country a permanent member of the SCO. Given that Afghanistan, India and Iran also look for partnerships in the bloc, one should welcome them as members too. The U.S. would thus face a dilemma: either give away South Asia for the SCO (to Russia and China that is) or try to retain the region at all costs.

#### Russian aggression causes nuclear war

Blank 9 Dr. Stephen Blank is a Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,¶ The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD**.** First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171¶ Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes,¶ But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172